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Introduction of Oil and Gas Development
This article provides an update concerning oil and gas law developments
in the Commonwealth of Kentucky from August 01, 2019, through July 31,
2020, and focuses on major legislative and regulatory enactments, as well
as developments in Kentucky common law.
I. Legislative and Regulatory Developments
The Kentucky General Assembly's regular session began on January 7,
2020, and was scheduled to conclude on April 15, 2020. However, due to
the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, the regular session was suspended
a week early on April 8, 2020. The following is a discussion of the notable
legislation relating to oil and gas law passed during the shortened regular
session.
A. House Bill 44
1. "Key Infrastructure Assets."
House Bill 44 ("HB 44") amends Kentucky Revised Statute Chapter 168,
Section 1, by adding to the definition of "key infrastructure assets" any
critical system used in the production or generation of energy.
Subsection(1)(a) of Section 1 is a list defining certain "key infrastructure
assets" in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. HB 44 adds to Section 1,
Subsection 1(a)(5) that natural gas or petroleum pipelines are types of
pipelines covered under the definition.1
B. Senate Bill 55
1. "Blockchain Technology Working Group."
Senate Bill 55 ("SB 55") adds an entirely new section to Kentucky
Revised Statute Chapter 42, Section 747, the creation of Blockchain
Technology Working Group ("Working Group"). Blockchain technology
allows computer systems to connect over the internet and share or distribute
data, transactions, contracts, etc. 2 Working Group is intended to be
attached to the Commonwealth Office of Technology for administrative
purposes. Under SB 55, the Working Group evaluates the feasibility and
efficacy of using blockchain technology to enhance the security and
increase protection for that state's critical infrastructure, including the
electric utility grid, natural gas pipelines, drinking water supply and
1. H.B. 44, 2020 Gen. Assemb., 2020 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2020).
2. S.B. 55, 2020 Gen. Assemb., 2020 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2020).
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delivery, wastewater, telecommunications, and emergency services. 3 The
Governor of Kentucky signed SB 55 into law on April 24, 2020.
II. Judicial Developments
A. EQT Prod. Co. v. Big Sandy Co.
EQT Prod. Co. v. Big Sandy Co., is a published decision from the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky. 4 Accordingly, it is binding in the Commonwealth
of Kentucky unless overruled by the Kentucky Supreme Court. On appeal,
EQT Production Company and EQT Gathering, LLC (collectively, "EQT")
argued that the circuit court erred as to the following: (1) ruling it must pay
to relocate pipelines and (2) that it could not recover payments mistakenly
made to Big Sandy Company, L.P. ("Big Sandy"). In a cross-appeal, Big
Sandy argued that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the phrase
"coal workings, extend or projected."
This case involved contractual rights outlined in two deeds addressing
coal, oil, and gas on property (56,000 acres) located in Pike County,
Kentucky. In 1926, predecessors of Big Sandy conveyed oil and gas
interests in and to a portion of the lands to R. J. Graf. They retained rights
to the coal, all minerals, and surface ownership, with the intent to mine and
remove the coal and other minerals within the property. In 1928, Big
Sandy conveyed the oil and gas to predecessors of EQT with language
similar to the first deed. According to the terms of the two deeds, EQT was
obligated to pay Big Sandy a royalty of 1/8 of oil produced from the
property and coal left in place around a well.5 Moreover, EQT was
required to interfere as little as reasonably possible with Big Sandy's right
to remove coal and other minerals and obtain approval for "[t]he location of
any oil or gas well through coal workings, extended or projected." 6
With respect to the issue regarding whether EQT must pay to relocate
pipelines, the Court of Appeals took a de novo review of the following
language:
[EQT] agrees to so use said land to so treat same and to so put
and use his pipelines, pumps, and buildings upon same as to
interfere as little as may be reasonably possible with the mining
and removal of said coal and other minerals, and to cause no
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id.
EQT Prod. Co. v. Big Sandy Co., 590 S.W.3d 275 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).
Id. at 280.
Id. at 280.
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unnecessary damage and waste to the remaining estate in the
lands, the coal, other minerals, surface, fencing, building or
timber and that whether said buildings, fencing or timber are
now on said land or may hereafter be placed thereon by the first
party, its successors or assigns lessees or tenants, and shall pay
for any damage done while using said land to crops or fences.7
An unambiguous written contract must be strictly enforced according to
the plain meaning of its express terms and without resort to extrinsic
evidence. 8 Even if the contracting parties may have intended a different
result, a contract cannot be interpreted contrary to the plain meaning of its
terms.9 The circuit court interpreted the language as "if EQT's pipeline
operations interfered more than as little as reasonably possible, EQT must
pay to relocate the pipelines."10 EQT asserted that the interpretation "gives
Big Sandy unbridled discretion to decide if and when EQT's pipeline must
be moved at their expense."11 However, the Court found that the circuit
court's interpretation did not rule that EQT's pipeline needed to be
relocated, that relocation would occur "only if" pipelines interfered more
than a little as reasonably possible with Big Sandy's operation (emphasis
added). Moreover, the Court noted, the payment of relocation only occurs
if EQT violates the language.
As to EQT's second argument, the standard of review on appeal of
summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that (1) there
was no genuine issue to any material fact and (2) that the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. According to the facts, in 2000, the
mistaken royalty payments were paid after a change in the payment system.
EQT stated they had no reason to review the payment system without a
request from the owner of the royalty, and Big Sandy waited more than four
years before notifying EQT of the payment mistake. 12 In its appeal, EQT
did not dispute that it had all necessary information to discover the
mistaken payments. EQT's corporate representative testified that all
information needed to identify the overpayment was at EQT's disposal.13 A
simple review of payment history, the mistake would have been discovered.
There was no disputed issues of material fact to decide.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 285.
Id. (citing Allen v. Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co., 216 S.W.3d 657 (Ky. App. 2007)).
Id. (citing Abney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 215 S.W.3d 699, 703 (Ky. 2006)).
Id. at 285, 286.
Id. at 286.
Id.at 288.
Id. at 288.
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Big Sandy argued that the phrase "extended or projected" applied to all
mineable and merchantable coal, contrary to the circuit court's
interpretation that such phrase applied only to coal that Big Sandy provided
intent to mine. 14 The circuit court found "extended or projected" as an
unambiguous phrase. An unambiguous phrase must be interpreted
according to the plain meaning of its express term. The "fact that one party
may have intended different results" is not enough to construct the words
differently. 15 The phrase appears twice in the deeds mentioned above. The
first limited EQT's ability to drill through air courses of mines that were
already in place or any coal mine "in operation or temporarily shut down." 16
The second use must accord to the same meaning as the first; a different
meaning would be inconsistent. Therefore, the second use of the phrase
would limit EQT to the existing activity of Big Sandy; if Big Sandy wanted
all mineable and merchantable coal, the phrase would not have been
included.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals found no error in the circuit court's
ruling and affirmed its decision.
B. Crisp v. Blackridge Appalachian Land, LLC.
Crisp v. Blackridge Appalachian Land, LLC, is an unpublished opinion
from the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 17 In this case, Thomas Crisp,
James Larger, Magnum Drilling of Ohio, Inc., and Magnum Drilling, Inc.
(collectively, "Magnum") appealed a declaratory judgment from the
Lawrence County Circuit Court, which held that a natural gas lease
Magnum held had expired.
In 1980, Sam and Joyce Caudill executed an oil and gas lease to Burchett
Investment Corporation on property known as the Blackburn Property.
Magnum purchased the lease in 2000, which property was owned by Anna
Rae Blackburn ("Ms. Blackburn"). The property contained one gas well
from which Ms. Blackburn and members of the Blackburn family had rights
to free gas. Magnum intended to drill new wells on the property due to the
one prior well not producing much gas. However, before drilling any new
wells, Magnum and Ms. Blackburn had a falling out, and Ms. Blackburn
ousted Magnum from the Blackburn Property. Magnum adhered to the
request and has not entered the property or removed gas from the original
14. Id. at 290.
15. Id at 291 (citing Abney, 215 S.W.3d 657).
16. Id.at 291.
17. Crisp v. Blackridge Appalachian Land, LLC, 2019-CA-000991-MR, 2020 WL
1898371 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2020).
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well since 2000. In 2015, Ms. Blackburn executed a new oil and gas lease
covering the Blackburn Property to Bigstar Energy, L.P., because she
believed the previous lease had terminated according to its terms, as there
had been no production from the well since 2000. 18
Magnum argued on appeal that there was a sufficient quantity of gas
produced on the property to keep the lease from termination. For an oil or
gas well to be deemed as producing, the well must produce oil or gas in
paying quantities. 19 Quantities must be substantial enough to pay the lessor
a royalty. 20 Based on the facts, Ms. Blackburn never received a royalty
payment for the well located on the Blackburn Property. For over a decade
Magnum never built, permitted, or drilled any new wells on Blackburn
Property. Although Ms. Blackburn ousted Magnum from entering the
Blackburn Property, Magnum took no action to enter the Blackburn
Property after the oust. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court
that Magnum's well had produced no gas; therefore, under the terms of the
lease, the lease had terminated.21
Magnum further argued the circuit court erred in determining whether
gas was produced in paying quantities. The determination of whether gas is
produced in paying quantities is a question of fact. 22 The court received no
meter readings or measurements of the amount gas used in the houses on
the Blackburn Property, just speculative testimony of the possibility of free
gas being enough to warrant paying quantities. 23 Magnum failed to show
the production of gas on the Blackburn Property in over ten years.
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court of Appeals found no error in
the circuit court's ruling and affirmed the circuit court's decision.

18. Id. at 1.
19. Id. at 2. (citing Sawyer v. Potter, 223 Ky. 359, 3 S.W.2d 758, 759 (1928)).
20. Id. at 2. (citing Cumberland Contracting Co. v. Coffey, 405 S.W.2d 553 (Ky.
1966)).
21. Id. at 2.
22. Id. at 2. (citing Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 248 Ky. 646, 59 S.W.2d 534, 537
(1933)).
23. Id. at 2.
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